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Abstract 
The ratio bias––according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of 
large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small 
numbers––has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics 
emphasizing the policy importance of the phenomenon. Although the bias has been replicated 
several times, some doubts remain about its economic significance. Our two experiments show that 
the bias disappears once order effects are excluded, and once salient and dominant incentives are 
provided. This holds true for both choice and valuation tasks. Also, adding context to the decision 
problem does not change this outcome. No ratio bias could be found in between-subject tests either, 
which leads us to the conclusion that the policy relevance of the phenomenon is doubtful at best. 
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1. MOTIVATION 
Echos of the importance of the ratio bias phenomenon are increasingly heard especially in health 
economics. Pinto, Martinez, and Abellán (2006) found that people accept less risks when health 
risks are represented as cases in 1000 than when they are represented as cases in 100. Bonner and 
Newell (2008) found that risk of cancer is perceived as greater when subjects are told that “36,500 
people die from cancer every year” compared to when they are told that “100 people die from 
cancer every day”, and that the ratio bias thus overwhelms the immediacy effect of using days 
instead of years (Trope and Liberman, 2003). Even worse, Yamagishi (1997) found that cancer was 
perceived as riskier when described as killing 1,286 out of 10,000 people than when described as 
killing 24.14 out of 100 people. If the ratio bias is indeed as strong as these claims suggest, it may 
have important implications for policy design, since risks communicated depend on the time-frame 
in which they are expressed. 
 People are said to incur into ratio bias whenever they prefer to bet on prospects expressed as 
a ratio of large numbers to betting on normatively equivalent or superior prospects expressed as a 
ratio of small numbers (e.g. they prefer betting on 10 red balls in an urn with 100 balls rather than 
on one red ball in an urn with 10 balls). Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1989) first showed how a 
given event seems more suspicious to people when it results from a low number of occurrences than 
when it results from a high number of occurrences, keeping probabilities constant. Kirkpatrick and 
Epstein (1992) replicated this finding for preferences between prospects with equal probability 
expressed with different ratios. Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) showed that people are not only 
ready to pay for their preference for the urn with the higher absolute number of balls, but they keep 
committing the bias even when they are explicitly told the probabilities involved in the different 
choices (see also Pacini and Epstein, 1999). 
 If one were to accept this evidence, the ratio bias phenomenon would deserve a place in a 
long list of cognitive biases that have shed doubt on the existence of the perfectly rational homo 
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oeconomicus of traditional economic models. In particular, decision makers have been found to 
reverse their preferences between choice and pricing tasks (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Tversky 
and Thaler, 1990), to shy away from unknown probabilities when normatively equivalent known 
probabilities are available (Chow and Sarin, 2001; Ellsberg, 1961; Kocher and Trautmann, 2008), to 
be unduly influenced by preexisting situations (Eisenberger and Weber, 1995; Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler, 1991; Roca, Hogarth, and Maule, 2006), and many more. Even in this long list of 
rationality failures, the ratio bias phenomenon seems particularly troubling. Its disconcerting nature 
from the point of view of economic rationality rests in the observation that it does not rely on any 
level of cognitive complexity—an inferior probability prospect is chosen over one offering a better 
probability of winning in plain knowledge of the probabilities involved. There is neither an issue of 
obviously missing information as in ambiguity aversion (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Frisch and 
Baron, 1988; Trautmann, Vieider, and Wakker, 2008), nor any complexities as may be involved in 
pricing versus simple choice tasks which have been used to explain preference reversals (Schmidt, 
Starmer, and Sugden, 2008). 
 However, the economic stability of the ratio bias has not yet been established  and it is thus 
premature to derive policy recommendations from the experimental findings cited above. Indeed, 
several aspects of existing experimental manipulations appear unconvincing from an experimental 
economist's point of view, and could be driving at least part of the results.  First, experiments are 
usually conducted without salient and dominant financial incentives (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; 
Smith, 1982). While sometimes incentives have been provided, they are very small, with differences 
in expected values between the superior and inferior prospects generally below $0.05. 
 Second, subjects are often explicitly told to follow their gut feeling (e.g. Denes-Raj, Epstein, 
and Cole, 1995; Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992), and experiments are generally conducted 
individually, involving direct observation of the decision by the experimenter. This seems apt to 
introduce an experimenter demand effect by making it clear to subjects what is expected of them 
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(Greenwald, 1978; Minor, 1970; Sawyer, 1975). Since monetary incentives are generally absent or 
low, there is no significant cost of conforming to the experimenter's view. 
 Third, psychology students are generally used for the tests. Since psychology students are 
used to participating in many experiments as part of their course requirements, and since deception 
is routinely used in these experiments, they may be particularly prone to fall prey to experimenter 
demand effects (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). 
 Last, typical experiments do not control for potential error rates or noise in the observations, 
and may thus overestimate the ratio bias effect. In typical ratio bias experiments, the urn with the 
larger number of balls is always inferior or equal in probability, while there is no control for cases 
in which the large urn is superior. Not controlling for error rates, Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) find 
that between 61% and 54% of subjects choose the large urn when the latter offers a probability of 
9/100 against a 1/10 probability of the small urn. Dale et al. (2007) include a control for error rates. 
They find that while about 41% of choices indicate a ratio bias, there are also 25% of choices which 
are suboptimal in the opposite direction, thus indicating an extremely high noise rate. 
In this paper we test the economic stability and relevance of the ratio bias phenomenon. In 
order to do this, we carried out several experiments. In experiment 1 we implement a design 
adapted from Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994), but we introduce some first attempts at debiasing by 
introducing monetary prizes for some subjects and by trying to prevent potential demand effects. 
Experiment 2 introduces financial incentives of varying sizes for all subjects, and explicitly controls 
for error rates. Also, we test the bias with choice tasks as well as with valuation tasks. Moreover we 
compare decisions made in neutral tasks and in contextualized frameworks. Finally, we test for 
occurrence of ratio bias both within- and between-subject. The latter approach in particular may be 
important to ascertain the policy relevance of the phenomenon, since risks are generally 
communicated in only one way, and not comparatively in two different formats as has been done in 
existing experiments. Experiment 1 finds results that are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in 
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the psychology literature, with a persistent ratio bias. However, the rates of bias are reduced 
substantially compared to the ones found in earlier experiments. Experiment 2 tries to replicate this 
result with deterministic incentives, as well as introducing randomization in the sequence of choice 
pairs. Choices of the large urn are significantly reduced in this setting. Furthermore, controlling for 
errors shows that the remaining occurrences of the ratio bias can be attributed exclusively to the 
presence of large levels of noise. We thus conclude that the ratio bias is an artifact due to 
methodological flaws present in the existing literature. 
The remainder of  this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the design and the 
results of our experiment 1. Section 3  introduces the protocol and the results of experimetn 2.  
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. EXPERIMENT 1: TESTING FOR ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE 
This experiment was conducted to establish whether the ratio bias is economically significant—that 
is, whether the bias still occurs when decisions are made for real money or whether it is merely an 
artifact deriving from demand effects or issues in information presentation. While the ratio bias has 
been tested with monetary incentives before, we argue that such incentives were not large enough to 
fulfill the precepts of salience and dominance. Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) used a prize of $1. 
Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) offered a prize of $5 in their high stakes condition in experiment 2, 
with differences in expected value between the two urns at or below 5¢. Dale et al. (2007) used 
monetary prizes of 5¢ or 10¢. In order to test for the effect of such incentives, we compare a 
hypothetical treatment to a treatment in which financial incentives are provided. We propose to use 
a large prize to make the decision economically significant for subjects. Also, we want to avoid a 
potential demand effect that may have occurred in previous experiments. In order to achieve this, 
we go through some lengths to assure subjects of the confidentiality of their decisions. 
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2.1 Experimental design 
Subjects: 166 subjects were recruited from a list of volunteers at Erasmus University Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands. Subjects were run in groups of approximately 15 people. These groups were randomly 
assigned to either the hypothetical condition (N=86) or the real-stakes condition (N=80). The 
average age of the subjects was 21.8 years, and 58% were male.  All subjects were paid a flat fee of 
€15 ($23) to carry out the task described below in addition to several other, unrelated, tasks. No 
additional earning possibilities were mentioned in the recruitment process in order to avoid a 
possible selection bias into the real-incentive treatment.  
 
Incentive manipulation: In the hypothetical treatment, subjects were paid the participation fee and 
dismissed once they had completed the questionnaire. In the real incentives treatment, 1 out of 
every 5 subjects additionally played for real money. The prize to be won was €80. Monetary 
incentives were implemented using a random incentive mechanism (Abdellaoui, Baillon, and 
Wakker, 2007; Harrison, Lau, and Williams, 2002; Holt and Laury, 2002; Myagkov and Plott, 
1997). One of the tasks was randomly selected for real play.  Since other tasks not described in this 
paper were also included in the random extraction mechanism, the probability of having at least one 
ratio bias task extracted was 1/3 conditional on being selected for real play. The 8 answers had then 
the same probability of being extracted.  
 We wanted subjects to feel as unobserved as possible in order to avoid potential demand 
effects. To assure them of their anonymity,  subjects in the real payoff condition obtained a 
randomly generated number that was associated to their questionnaire. 20% of these numbers were 
then extracted, and the choices indicated on the corresponding questionnaire were played for real 
money. Subjects could then later pick up their winnings by presenting their number to a secretary on 
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a different floor. This procedure guarantees that subjects remain anonymous and thus avoids also 
the introduction of additional confounds (Vieider, 2009). 
 
Task: Subjects were presented with eight choices between two urns containing 10 and 100 balls 
respectively. The small urn was kept constant at one red (winning) ball out of 10. The composition 
of the large urn was varied so as to provide increasingly worse probabilities of winning, from 10, 9, 
8,...,3 winning balls out of 100. These choices were presented sequentially on the same page, in a 
design adapted from the one used by Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994).  The large urn was always 
placed below the small urn (see appendix A). In addition to these choice tasks, subjects were asked 
to indicate their willingness to pay (WTP) for the equal probability urns only. This WTP questions 
was not incentivized. 
 
Hypotheses. We hypothesized that a ratio bias would be observed in the choices. This hypothesis 
implies that for the equal probability urns choices of the large urn would be significantly greater 
than 50% (randomization). For cases in which the large urn is inferior, any choices of the large urn 
can be interpreted as ratio bias. However, we formally test for the null hypothesis that the choice 
frequency of the normatively inferior large urn is greater than a 5% error rate.1 Also, we 
hypothesized that subjects would be willing to pay significantly more for the large urn than for the 
small urn when the two urns offer equal probabilities of winning. 
 
2.2 Results 
We first look at the case in which the two urns provide equal probabilities of winning aggregating 
across the incentive conditions. The hypothesis that people randomize between the two urns when 
                                                
1  The value of 5% used is completely discretionary. This problem will be dealt with explicitly in experiment 2. 
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they offer equal probabilities of winning is strongly rejected (p < 0.001, binomial test).2 Indeed, 
68% of subjects choose the large urn when the two urns offer the same probability of winning. 
Though WTP was found to be somewhat higher for the large as compared to the small urn (€5.66 
versus €5.24), the effect fails to reach significance (t(165) = 0.83, p = 0.389). 
 As one might expect, the choice proportion of the large urn is strongly reduced when the 
probability of winning in the large urn is progressively reduced, as can be seen in Figure 1. 
However, 23% of subjects still choose the large urn when the probability of winning is reduced to 
9/100. The number of people choosing the inferior large urn is then progressively reduced for worse 
probabilities of winning with the large urn, but dives under 10% only once the large urn offers a 
probability of winning that is 5% smaller than the one in the small urn. The hypothesis that the 
choice of the inferior large urn is equal to a 5% error rate is rejected for all but the last two urns in 
the series of 8, which offer probabilities of winning that are inferior by 7% and 8% than the one 
offered by the small urn respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Choices of the normatively inferior large urn for decreasing probabilities of winning. 
 
 
 While these numbers appear large at first sight, they are substantially smaller than choices of 
                                                
2  All p-values reported are two-sided, unless specified otherwise. 
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the inferior large urn previously observed in the psychology literature. Comparing the findings to 
the ones in Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994), we find that only the choice pattern for the two equal 
probability urns is roughly comparable. Indeed, Denes-Raj and Epstein find that 61% and 54% (in 
their experiments 1 and 2 respectively) choose the inferior large urn when the probability of the 
latter is lowered to 9/100. 23% and 34% still choose the large urn when the latter offers a 
probability of winning of 5/100, which is 5% lower than in the small urn. The choice frequencies 
they find for the inferior urn are thus substantially larger than the one we find in this experiment, 
running at 23% for 9/100 and 9% for 5/100. 
The question of whether the effect is economically significant remains to be answered. We 
thus proceed to testing whether the provision of economic incentives makes a difference. Figure 1 
shows choice proportions for the large urn by probability of winning that is foregone by that choice.  
At first sight, incentives seem to increase the ratio bias for all but the largest probability differences. 
To test whether this difference is significant, we estimate random-effects Probit models on the eight 
sequential choices that were presented to the subjects. The random-effects model is justified by the 
fact that each subject makes repeated decisions. The dependent variable is the choice of the large 
urn.  The independent variables include a dummy variable for the incentive treatment and the 
difference in probability of winning between the two urns, They also include demographic variables 
controlling for gender and age.  We estimate four models separately. 
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Table 1: Determinant of choice of the large urn in experiment 1 (random-effects Probit models) 
 
  
 I II III IV 
Incentives 0.173 [0.038] 
(0.155) 
0.319 [0.013] 
(0.283) 
.293 [.011] 
(.280) 
0.295 [0.011] 
(.279) 
Difference in 
winning 
probability 
 –68.107 [–2.633]*** 
(4.920) 
–69.221 [–2.502]*** 
(5.187) 
–69.267 [–2.498]*** 
(5.192) 
Male   –.990 [–.049]*** 
(.287) 
–1.012 [–0.050]*** 
(0.288) 
Age    0.037 [0.001] 
(.046) 
Constant –1.184*** 
(0.112) 
0.069 
(0.212) 
0.668* 
(0.275) 
–0.121 
(1.014) 
Nr. of subjects 
Nr. of observations 
Log-likelihood 
Wald χ2 
p>χ2 
166 
1328 
–575 
1.26 
 0.26 
166 
1328 
–375 
192 
<0.001 
166 
1328 
–370 
180 
<0.001 
166 
1328 
–369 
180 
<0.001 
Note: Marginal effects in square brackets, standard errors in round brackets; * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level, two-sided. 
 
As can be seen from the results reported in Table 1, incentives do not have a significant 
effect. As one might expect, the difference in probability of winning between the two urns exerts a 
strong influence on choices. There is also a strong gender effect, while age exerts no significant 
effect—which is hardly surprising, given the low variability of age in the subject population. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
With 23% of choices of the large, inferior urn, when the latter offers a probability of winning of 
9/100 against the 1/10 of the small urn, we do indeed find a ratio bias. However, this bias appears to 
be much weaker than its occurrences previously observed in the literature. Indeed, Denes-Raj and 
Epstein (1994) found between 61% and 54% of choices of the large inferior urn for the same 
probability, and Dale et al. (2007) found about 42% of choices of the large urn for the same 
probability difference. Incentives are not effective at further reducing the bias found. It thus seems 
that the weakening of the bias stems from the measures put into place to avoid experimenter 
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demand effects. 
 One potential criticism is however that incentives provided were too low to make the 
decisions seem important to the subjects. Although the nominal prize was high, the probability of 
extraction of any single choice in the ratio bias task was only 1/120. While no difference between 
random incentives and deterministic incentives has generally been found in the literature (Hey and 
Lee, 2005; Lee, 2008; Starmer and Sugden, 1991), the probability of extraction in this task was 
indeed extremely low, and certainly outside the range for which effects of random incentives have 
been tested. Also, the combination of random extraction of one subject, random extraction of one 
out of three tasks, and random extraction of one choice within that task may have created a feeling 
of irrelevance. 
 A second criticism that can be brought against the results presented above is that error was 
not explicitly controlled for. While it is true that choices for the inferior urn for the smallest 
probability difference of 1% are still hovering around 23%, it is not unthinkable that a large 
proportion of these choices were due to noise and that the relevance of the ratio bias phenomenon is 
thus much lower than a first look at the data would suggest. Indeed, Dale et al. (2007) found error 
rates that are very similar to the occurrence of the bias in our experiment, even though they still 
found a significant ratio bias in excess of those errors. Admittedly, the employment of a 5% error 
rate against which to test the occurrence of the bias used above is utterly arbitrary and will be dealt 
with in experiment 2.  
 A number of other criticisms can be brought against the design. Indeed, one could argue that 
the sequential presentation of the choices in a fixed order induces some coherence effect by which 
subjects who have chosen the large urn when the two urns were probabilistically equivalent are 
more likely to stick with the choice of the large urn. Another potential criticism is that the bias 
persists due to the artificiality of the laboratory task. Indeed, context has sometimes been shown to 
improve rationality (Griggs, 1995), though the existing evidence on the ratio bias seems to rather 
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point in the direction of an accentuation of irrationality when context is added (Pinto, Martinez, and 
Abellán, 2006; Yamagishi, 1997). Since however no incentives were provided in previous 
experiments, nothing can be said about their economic significance. 
 
3. EXPERIMENT 2: CONTROLLING FOR ERROR AND  
UNIVERSAL INCENTIVES 
Experiment 2 tries to obviate to the potential criticisms described above in several ways. First of all, 
we introduce deterministic incentives whereby every subject plays for real money. Second, we 
introduce some control choices in which the large urn is superior, which enables us to explicitly 
control for the error rate. Dale et al. (2007) control for error rates and still find a significant ratio 
bias. However, the incentives they provide are in the order of 5¢–10¢, which implies a negligible 
difference in expected value between the two urns. By making incentives more salient, we want to 
test whether the phenomenon is indeed stable. We thus use two stake levels, regular stakes which 
are already superior to the stakes found in previous experiments on the ratio bias, and a treatment in 
which stakes were increased by a factor of 10. 
 In addition, we try to minimize experimenter demand effects by reassuring subjects of their 
anonymity and by randomizing both the order in which choices appear as well as the position in 
which the options are presented within one choice (i.e. whether the small urn is located above or 
below the large one). Furthermore, we use both certainty equivalent (CE) and pricing tasks in 
addition to choices and we introduce context into some decision problems to test the robustness of 
the ratio bias to the nature of tasks. Last, we implement both a between-subject design and a within-
subject design to investigate the potential policy relevance of the ratio bias phenomenon. 
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3.1 Experimental design: General remarks 
Subjects. The experiment has been conducted at GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie 
Economique), at the University of Lyon, France.  78 undergraduate students from the local 
engineering and business schools were recruited using the ORSEE  software developed by Greiner 
(2004). 64% of subjects were female, the average age was 22.  Sessions were conducted in the 
computer laboratory in groups of 20 subjects. In one High-Stakes session only 19 subjects showed 
up. One more subject in the High-Stakes condition had to be sent away because of technical issues 
with the computer station. We thus ended up with 40 subjects in the Low-Stakes condition and 38 
subjects in the High-Stakes condition. 
 
Structure. Several tasks were used to explore the ratio bias phenomenon. In addition to choice tasks 
similar to the ones used in experiment one, we also used investment and insurance tasks, as well as 
a context-free task in which certainty equivalents were elicited. Also, we elicited values both within 
and between subject to test for policy relevance of the issues discussed. The three types of choices 
are discussed separately below. Subjects were reassured about their anonymity, and all instructions 
were provided on the computer screen (see Appendices). Finally, differently from Dale et al. (2007) 
and Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994), but similarly to our experiment 1, urns were not visually 
displayed. This difference seems however not to be crucial, given that studies without visualization 
have also found a large ratio bias (Bonner and Newell, 2008; Pinto et al., 2006; Yamagishi, 1997). 
The experiment was conducted using the REGATE software (Zeiliger, 2000). Subjects were given a 
show-up fee of €5 ($7). Average earnings were €23.62 ($35) for an experiment that lasted less than 
30 minutes. 
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3.2 Choice tasks 
Task. The task consisted in repeated choices between lotteries. Subjects made 25 choices in total.  
The choice pairs were designed in such a way as to allow us to control for error, as well as to 
explore potential drivers of the ratio bias phenomenon. Both the order of the choice pairs and the 
location of the large versus small urn on the screen (above versus below) were randomized for each 
subject. Each choice pair involved a choice between one large urn and one small urn. 3 choice pairs 
provided the same probability for the large and small urn; 18 choice pairs provided a better 
probability of winning in the small urn than in the large urn; and 4 choice pairs provided a worse 
probability of winning in the small urn than in the large urn to control for random errors. A list of 
the choice pairs used is provided in Appendix B, together with a screenshot of the choice setting 
subjects faced on the computer. 
 
Incentives. Incentives were varied randomly within subject between a prize of €2, €7, and €12 ($3, 
$10, and $18) for half the subjects. The other half was assigned to the High-Stakes condition, in 
which the prize was varied randomly between €20, €70, and €120 ($30, $100, and $180). For one 
choice pair, the prize was kept fixed at €4 and €40 in the two conditions. This was done to insure 
comparability with the comparative investment task described below—since no interesting results 
emerged from this comparison, it will not be mentioned further. This randomly extracted prize as 
well as the descriptions of the two urns were displayed prominently on the screen for each decision. 
Every subject played one of the 25 choices for real money, with each choice having the same 
probability of being played for real. The random draw for this choice task (as well of the random 
draws for the following tasks) was operated at the very end of the session so that its outcome could 
not influence further choices. 
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Hypotheses. We hypothesize that the proportion of choices for the large urn when the latter provides 
the same probability as the small urn is significantly greater than 50%. Also, we hypothesize that 
the choice frequency of the large urn is significantly greater than the error rate (that is, the 
proportion of choices for the large urn when the latter provides probabilities of winning that are 
inferior to the ones provided by the small urn is significantly higher than the number of choices of 
the small urn providing inferior probabilities of winning). We also want to test whether varying 
incentives within subjects produces significant differences in behavior. Finally, we were interested 
if the ratio bias phenomenon may be reduced with very high stakes varied between subjects. 
 
Results. General choice patterns are summarized in Figure 2 separately for the Low- and High-
Stakes conditions. Overall, the large urn was chosen only 47% of the time when offering the same 
probability of winning as the small urn. We thus cannot reject the null hypothesis that in cases of 
equal probability the large urn will be chosen 50% of the time (p = 0.33, binomial test). When the 
large urn is inferior, it is chosen on average 7.19% of the time. The ratio bias in this experiment is 
thus much smaller than the one observed in experiment one. Looking now at the error rate, we see 
that the small urn is chosen on average 9.61% of the time when it is inferior. We can thus not reject 
the hypothesis that the frequency of choices consistent with a ratio bias explanation is the same as 
the error rate (t(77) = –0.47, p = 0.64). 
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Figure 2: Percentage of choices of the large urn by difference  in the probability of winning  
for the Low- and the High-Stakes conditions 
 
 We next look at the influence of within-subject stake variations, between-subject stake 
variations, and several other potential explanatory variables. We have estimated the determinants of 
the probability of choice of the large urn by means of four random-effects Probit models. The 
independent variables include the normalized prize that captures the within-subject variation of 
stakes, and a dummy variable indicating the High-Stakes condition. We also include a dummy 
variable (‘large urn superior’) indicating the choice pairs in which the large urn is superior, used to 
control for error, and another dulmmy variable (‘equal probability’) indicating that the two choices 
offered the same probability of winning.  We also control for the probability difference between the 
two urns, calculated as the probability of winning with the small urn minus the probability of 
winning with the large urn. In the last regression, we include demographic variables. Table 2 reports 
the results of these regressions. 
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Table 2: Determinants of choice of the large urn in experiment 2 (random-effects Probit models) 
 I II III IV  
Normalized 
prize (within) 
–0.001 [0.000] 
(0.001) 
–0.001 [.000] 
(0.001) 
–0.001 [0.000] 
(0.001) 
–0.001 [0.000] 
(0.001) 
 
High-Stakes 
(between) 
0.107 [0.031] 
(0.122) 
0.121 [0.030] 
(0.144) 
0.122 [0.030] 
(0.144) 
0.107 [0.026] 
(0.147) 
 
Large urn  
superior 
2.593 [0.804]*** 
(0.112) 
3.049 [0.872]*** 
(0.123) 
3.049 [0.872]*** 
(0.164) 
3.044 [0.872]*** 
(0.164) 
 
Equal probability  1.572 [0.363]*** 
(0.107) 
1.560 [0.532]*** 
(0.121) 
1.560 [0.532]*** 
(0.121) 
 
Probability difference   –0.331 [–0.081] 
(8.504) 
–0.370 [–0.090] 
(8.515) 
 
Male    –0.124 [–0.030] 
(0.153) 
 
Age    –0.003 [–0.001] 
(0.012) 
 
Constant –1.227*** 
(0.107) 
–1.679*** 
(0.130) 
–1.677*** 
(0.143) 
–1.571*** 
(0.218) 
 
Nr. of subjects 
Nr. of observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ2 
p>χ2 
78 
1950 
 –699 
540 
 <.001 
78 
1950 
–584 
662 
<.001 
78 
1950 
–584 
662 
<.001 
78 
1950 
–584 
662 
<.001 
 
Note: Standard errors in round brackets, marginal effects in square brackets; * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level, two-sided. 
 
Table 2 shows that neither the within-subject variation in prizes (normalized across stakes 
conditions) nor the between-subject stake variation have any significant effect on decisions. As 
expected, when the large urn is superior subjects are significantly more likely to choose it than 
when it is inferior. In contrast, when the two urns provide an equal winning probability people are 
less likely to choose it than when it is inferior. The difference in the probability of winning exerts no 
further influence. Gender is no longer significant.  
 
Discussion. At first sight, there seems to be a small ratio bias, even though it stays below 10% on 
average. Controlling however for error rates, these regressions show that these choices are entirely 
due to error or noise, inasmuch as there is no systematic preference pattern for the larger urn. This 
result remains stable across different stake levels, both within- and between-subject. The latter 
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finding can be explained by the fact that choices of the large urn are already substantially reduced in 
the Small-Stakes condition. Indeed, providing stakes of €7 ($10) on average to every participant 
combined with randomization and confidentiality of choices seems already to be sufficient to 
eliminate the bias. Given that choices of the inferior urn are already very low in the baseline 
condition, multiplying the stakes by a factor of 10 has no further effects.  
Since some of the recent claims on the importance of the ratio bias phenomenon have been obtained 
through rating tasks rather then choices, we next examine comparative evaluations. 
 
3.3 Comparative valuation tasks: Adding context 
Employing comparative rating tasks rather than choice tasks generally adds context in addition to 
the different elicitation method used. Health economics issues generally studied however have the 
disadvantage of not easily allowing for the introduction of real incentives. We thus propose to use 
an investment task to add context whilst being able to implement the value elicitation in an 
incentive compatible way. In addition to the investment task, we also use an insurance task to test 
whether negative outcomes may be more prone to ratio bias than positive outcomes. While using 
losses has been found to produce less ratio bias than gains in choice tasks (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 
1994; Kirkpatrick and Epstein, 1992), the risk rating tasks used in the health economics literature do 
generally involve losses and have found a very large ratio bias (Bonner and Newell, 2008; Pinto, 
Martinez, and Abellán, 2006; Yamagishi, 1997). 
 
Tasks. In the investment task, subjects were presented with two investment projects, project A and 
project B. The two projects were displayed on the same screen, and choices had to be made between 
investing increasing amounts in each one of the investment projects and not investing (choice lists 
in Appendix C).  Project A offered a probability of success of 7/100, and project B of 61/1000. In 
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the insurance task, subjects were offered to buy insurance against a low probability loss of their €5 
($7) show-up fee (see Appendix C). The risks in the insurance task were 59/1000 and 423/10000 
respectively. 
 
Incentives. Both tasks described above were played for real money. For the investment task, 
subjects were given an initial endowment of €0.60 (90¢) in the Low-Stakes condition, and €6 ($9) 
in the High-Stakes condition. The prize to be won in the two investment tasks was of €4 ($6) in the 
Low-Stakes condition and €40 ($60) in the High-Stakes condition. In the insurance task, the amount 
to be lost was not varied and stayed fixed at the show-up fee of €5 ($7). For either task, at the end 
of the session one of the two investment projects or insurance scenarios would first be randomly 
selected for real play. Then one of the decisions would be selected and played for real. In the 
investment task, if a subject had decided not to invest for the selected line, she could keep her 
endowment and the game was over. If she had selected to invest, the investment amount was 
subtracted from the endowment and the prospect was played out. An analogous procedure was used 
for the insurance task. 
 
Hypotheses. The two investment projects and insurance scenarios are characterized by different 
probabilities, as well as being represented with small versus large ratios. We thus hypothesize that 
the difference that subjects are willing to pay over the expected value of the investment (or the 
expected loss in the insurance case) will be larger for the large ratio than for the small ratio. 
 
Results. Five subjects in the investment task and two subjects in the insurance task were excluded 
from the analysis because they switched multiple times between the certain amount and the 
prospect for at least one of the two investment projects; therefore it was impossible to calculate the 
 2
0 
willingness-to-pay for these subjects. Since probabilities differ in the two investment opportunities, 
a test for equality of amount invested is not adequate. We thus calculate the difference between the 
highest amount subjects are willing to invest in each project and the expected value of the 
investment, and test for equality of this premium. The mean values of the premia are reported in 
Table 3 separately for low and high stakes. No High-Stakes condition existed in the comparative 
insurance task; all subjects played for the show-up fee of €5 ($7). Table 3 also reports the mean 
amount subjects are willing to pay for the insurance in excess of the expected value of the loss.  
 
Table 3: Mean amounts in excess of expected values (premia) that subjects are willing to pay, in € 
 
 Project/Scenario A Project/Scenario B 
Investment – Low-Stakes* 1.46 
(0.21) 
1.39 
(0.25) 
Investment – High-Stakes 0.89 
(0.31) 
0.48 
(0.34) 
Insurance 0.42 
(0.04) 
0.47 
(0.04) 
Note: * Values are normalized to high stakes amounts through multiplication by 10; standard deviations in brackets. 
 
 While the excess premia appear to be much lower in the High-Stakes than in the Low-Stakes 
condition, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two premia are the same in the Low-Stakes 
condition (t(39) = 0.58, p = 0.56). For the High-Stakes condition, we find a marginally significant 
difference between the two premia (t(32) = –1.99, p = 0.06). Notice however that this effect goes in 
the opposite direction of the one predicted by the ratio bias hypothesis. In the insurance task, testing 
the null hypothesis that the premium paid over the expected value of the loss is equal in the two 
scenarios, we reject that hypothesis in favor of the one that the premium is higher for the larger ratio 
(t(78) = 2.08, p = 0.04). This would lead us to conclude that ratio bias does indeed occur. Before we 
jump to such a conclusion, it is however instructive to take a closer look at the data. For scenario A, 
39 subjects out of 76 (51.32%) never switch between the sure amount and the prospect, with an 
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overwhelming majority of those who never switch (33/39) willing to buy insurance at any amount it 
was offered at (and the remaining 6 never willing to buy insurance). A similar finding holds for 
scenario B, in which 41 out of 76 subjects (53.95%) never switch. Again, an overwhelming majority 
of subjects who never switch (33/41) are willing to take out insurance at any cost it was offered at. 
The results of the previously reported t-test thus seems to be due to a ceiling effect in the prices at 
which insurance was offered. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the number of subjects 
who never switch is the same for scenarios A and B (t(73) = –1.0, p = 0.32). Given that the expected 
value is lower for scenario B, these subjects are likely to drive the results. Carrying out the same 
test as above only for subjects that do switch and are thus not at the margin, we accept the null 
hypothesis that no ratio bias exists (t(29) = 0.48, p = 0.64).  
 
Discussion. We find no ratio bias when we add context to the decisions, and when decisions consist 
in comparative pricing tasks instead of straight choice tasks. A ratio bias is found neither for gains 
nor for losses. However, in the insurance task we lose some power due to the ceiling effects 
described above. Indeed, due to the choice list employed for the elicitation of the willingness-to-pay 
for insurance, the maximum willingness-to-pay that could be stated was about 3-4 times the 
expected value of the loss, depending on the scenario. Quite a few subjects were willing to pay 
more than that amount to buy insurance. This finding is consistent with findings in the literature on 
strong loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Köbberling and Wakker, 2005; Schmidt and 
Zank, 2005) and the excessive uptake of insurance (Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989).  
 In addition, we find the typical pattern of risk seeking for small probability gains. Subjects 
are on average willing to invest an amount in excess of the expected value of the prospect in the 
investment task. This finding is consistent with the evidence presented in the literature on 
probability weighting, and in particular with overweighting of small probabilities (Abdellaoui, 
2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996). Also, 
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this risk seeking behavior seems to be reduced in the High-Stakes condition, which is also 
consistent with previous findings in the literature (Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul, 1990; Holt and 
Laury, 2002). Since this finding has however wider implications, it is described in a separate paper 
in order not unduly complicate the exposition (Lefebvre, Vieider, and Villeval, 2009). 
 At this point, there is still one objection that can be raised to our analysis. Indeed, while all 
existing studies on the ratio bias employ either choice or rating tasks - and hence a strictly 
comparative setting - the potential policy relevance of the phenomenon may derive from the fact 
that probabilities represented as large ratios are overestimated more than equivalent small-ratio 
probabilities when considered in isolation. We thus next examine results on between-subject tests of 
the ratio bias phenomenon. 
 
3.4 Between-subject data: Policy relevance 
Recent results on the ratio bias phenomenon especially in the medical domain have been used to 
draw conclusions on the importance of the phenomenon for risk communication and policy issues. 
While we have not been able to replicate the ratio bias phenomenon in the experiments presented 
above, for risk communication and policy issues it would arguably be more important to know 
whether such a bias in risk evaluation might exist when only one way of communicating the risk is 
used at a time. Indeed, in reality risk is generally communicated just in one way, and it seems thus 
crucial to know whether a ratio bias is observed between subjects before proceeding to policy 
recommendations. To our best knowledge, this issue has never been addressed before. We thus 
introduced some between-subject rating tasks at the outset of the experiment before any 
comparative tasks were introduced in order to test for this hypothesis. We also added context in 
some of them, to see if such context may make a difference. Details are reported below. 
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Tasks. Three different tasks were introduced in a between-subject design in order to test for a 
between-subject ratio bias phenomenon. Each subject saw one of three ratios in the description of 
the problem. We used three ratios instead of two to create more variance.  The assignment of the 
ratio was randomly and independently determined for each subject and for each one of the three 
tasks (ratios are reported in Table 4). Task one (the neutral task) consisted in repeated choices 
between an increasing certain amount of money and a prospect offering the opportunity to win a 
prize. The second task (the insurance task) offered the opportunity to buy insurance against the 
possibility of losing the prize won in the neutral task. It was to be played out for real money at the 
end of the session only in case a subject had won the prize in task one. In task three (the investment 
task), subjects were asked to choose for subsequent amounts whether they would rather keep the 
amount or invest it. 
 
Table 4: Ratios presented to subjects in the between-subject ratio bias tasks 
Framing Low Ratio Medium Ratio High Ratio 
Neutral task 1/10 10/100 100/1000 
Insurance task (3/day)/80000 (72/month)/80000 (783/year)80000 
Investment task 7/100 59/1000 423/10000 
 
 
Incentives. The neutral task was to be played out for real money, offering a prize of €10 ($15) in the 
Low-Stakes condition and €100 ($150) in the High-Stakes condition. Subjects were asked to choose 
between a sure amount (certainty equivalent,) and playing the prospect for increasing certain 
amounts (see Appendix D). One line would be selected for real play at the end of the session, and 
the subject would either be paid the sure amount or play the prospect according to her choice for 
that line. In the investment tasks, subjects were initially endowed with €0.60 (90¢) in the Low-
Stakes condition and €6 ($9) in the High-Stakes condition. They were asked whether they were 
willing to invest increasing amounts of their endowment, with a potential return of €4 ($6) in the 
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Low-Stakes condition and €40 ($60) in the High-Stakes condition. One choice was then selected 
through a procedure analogous to the one used in the neutral task, except that if they had chosen to 
invest, the corresponding amount was now subtracted from their endowment before playing the 
prospect. The insurance task was to be played out conditional on a subject having won the prize in 
the neutral task only.  A procedure analogous to the one in the investment task was then used to 
determine payoffs (all choice lists can be found in Appendix D). 
 
Hypotheses. We hypothesize that subjects have a higher certainty equivalent the larger the urn in the 
neutral task, since probabilities are equal in those tasks. For the insurance task, we hypothesize that 
subjects are ready to pay a higher amount in excess of the expected value of the loss (probabilities 
are now different) as we pass from representations per day to month and year. Analogously, we 
hypothesize that for the investment task subjects are willing to invest more in excess of the 
expected value as we move to larger ratios. 
 
Results. In the neutral task, six subjects were dropped because they switched multiple times. All of 
these subjects were in the High-Stakes condition. We dropped for the same reason two subjects in 
the insurance task and six subjects in the investment task. Table 5 displays  the mean valuation of 
the subjects in each task and for each ratio. 
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Table 5. Mean valuations in the between-subject tasks  
 
Note: Standard deviations are in brackets.  
 
 Running an Anova on the certainty equivalents for the three different ratios in the neutral 
task, no significant difference is found (F(2,69) = 0.63, p = 0.54). The null hypothesis of equal 
certainty equivalents for different ratios can thus not be rejected. No significant difference is found 
if the same Anova is run separately for the Low-and the High-Stakes conditions, although we again 
find a reduction in risk seeking for high stakes. 
 In the insurance task, since probabilities of losing are now different we calculate the excess 
premium that subjects are willing to pay over the expected value of the loss for each ratio, and run 
an Anova on these derived values. In the Low-Stakes condition, there is a marginally significant 
effect indicating a ratio bias (F(2,37) = 2.83, p = 0.07). This effect is however not significant in the 
High-Stakes condition (F(2,33) = 2.27, p = 0.12). Also, a closer look at the data reveals that the 
result is mostly driven by a substantial amount of subjects (37/76 or 48.68%) who never switch, and 
who are equally distributed across the different ratios. All but one of these subjects choose to insure 
at any price the insurance is offered at. Once those subjects are eliminated, no significant 
differences persists between the excess premia paid for the different urns. 
Value in € Low Ratio Medium Ratio High Ratio 
Neutral task - Certainty 
equivalent 
(normalized to high stakes) 
14.50 
(6.29) 
n=29 
12.65 
(5.89) 
n=20 
12.94 
(6.77) 
n=23 
Insurance premium 13.42 
(7.13) 
n=29 
13.99 
(7.04) 
n=21 
14.50 
(6.05) 
n=26 
Insurance premium minus 
expected value 
2.47 
(7.13) 
5.35 
(7.04) 
6.67 
(6.04) 
Maximum investment 3.92 
(1.76) 
n=25 
3.59 
(1.77) 
n=31 
4.32 
(1.86) 
n=16 
Maximum investment minus 
expected value 
1.12 
(1.76) 
1.23 
(1.77) 
2.62 
(1.86) 
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In the investment task, since probabilities of success are again different for the different 
ratios, we  calculated the excess investment premium over expected value that subjects were willing 
to pay for each ratio. Running an Anova on this index for the Low-Stakes condition, we find a 
significant difference (F(2,35) = 3.28, p = 0.05), indicating the presence of ratio bias. Running the 
same Anova for the High-Stakes condition, the difference is no longer significant (F(2, 31) = 0.93, p 
= 0.41).  
 
Discussion. In general, we detect no ratio bias in the three between-subject tasks described in this 
section. Although at first glance there seems to be a marginally significant effect in the insurance 
setting, closer inspection of the data reveals that this finding is driven entirely by a ceiling effect on 
amounts that can be selected for insurance. This ceiling effect seems to derive from extreme loss 
aversion that is summed to the overweighting of small probabilities as discussed for the 
comparative insurance task above. Also, while there is some evidence for the ratio bias 
phenomenon in the investment task for small stakes, this effect is no longer present for large stakes. 
We thus conclude that the alleged policy relevance of the ratio bias phenomenon is doubtful at best.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
From the experiments conducted, it results clearly that the ratio bias that has been observed in 
choice tasks in the literature results from a combination of the failure to control for error, the 
presence of experimenter demand effects, and the absence of salient and dominant incentives. 
Indeed, by reducing the possibility of demand effects in experiment 1 we observe a frequency of 
ratio bias that is greatly reduced as compared to previous studies. Introducing significant incentives 
for everybody, further reducing the possibility of demand effects, and controlling for errors causes 
the ratio bias to disappear in experiment 2. This finding is robust even when context is added to the 
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decision problem, and for gain as well as loss formulations. Finally, no ratio bias is found 
systematically in between-subject tests either, with only some evidence in the investment task that 
does not resist an increase in monetary stakes. These results cast serious doubts on claims about the 
policy relevance of the ratio bias phenomenon. 
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Appendix A. Choices between lotteries to detect ratio bias – Experiment 1 
 
Problem 1 
Bag A contains 10 poker chips, 1 red chip and 9 green chips. Bag B contains 100 poker chips, 10 red chips and 90 green 
chips. You can win €80 by extracting a red chip from one of the two bags. Which bag do you choose? 
 
Bag A (1 red chip and 9 green chips) 
Bag B (10 red chips and 90 green chips) 
 
Problem 2 
Bag A contains 10 poker chips, 1 red chip and 9 green chips. Bag B contains 100 poker chips, 9 red chips and 91 green 
chips. You can win €80 by extracting a red chip from one of the two bags. Which bag do you choose? 
 
Bag A (1 red chip and 9 green chips) 
Bag B (9 red chips and 91 green chips) 
 
Problem 3 
Bag A contains 10 poker chips, 1 red chip and 9 green chips. Bag B contains 100 poker chips, 8 red chips and 92 green 
chips. You can win €80 by extracting a red chip from one of the two bags. Which bag do you choose? 
 
Bag A (1 red chip and 9 green chips) 
Bag B (8 red chips and 92 green chips) 
 
Problem 4 
Bag A contains 10 poker chips, 1 red chip and 9 green chips. Bag B contains 100 poker chips, 7 red chips and 93 green 
chips. You can win €80 by extracting a red chip from one of the two bags. Which bag do you choose? 
 
Bag A (1 red chip and 9 green chips) 
Bag B (7 red chips and 93 green chips) 
 
Problem 5 
Bag A contains 10 poker chips, 1 red chip and 9 green chips. Bag B contains 100 poker chips, 6 red chips and 94 green 
chips. You can win €80 by extracting a red chip from one of the two bags. Which bag do you choose? 
 
Bag A (1 red chip and 9 green chips) 
Bag B (6 red chips and 94 green chips) 
 
Problem 6 
Bag A contains 10 poker chips, 1 red chip and 9 green chips. Bag B contains 100 poker chips, 5 red chips and 95 green 
chips. You can win €80 by extracting a red chip from one of the two bags. Which bag do you choose? 
 
Bag A (1 red chip and 9 green chips) 
Bag B (5 red chips and 95 green chips) 
 
Problem 7 
Bag A contains 10 poker chips, 1 red chip and 9 green chips. Bag B contains 100 poker chips, 4 red chips and 96 green 
chips. You can win €80 by extracting a red chip from one of the two bags. Which bag do you choose? 
 
Bag A (1 red chip and 9 green chips) 
Bag B (4 red chips and 96 green chips) 
 
Problem 8 
Bag A contains 10 poker chips, 1 red chip and 9 black chips. Bag B contains 100 poker chips, 3 red chips and 97 green 
chips. You can win €80 by extracting a red chip from one of the two bags. Which bag do you choose? 
 
Bag A (1 red chip and 9 green chips) 
Bag B (3 red chips and 97 green chips) 
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Appendix B – Screenshots of the choice tasks – Experiment 2 
 
Decision Pair Low Ratio (small urn) High (large urn) 
Pair 1 1/10 10/100 
Pair 2 1/10 9/100 
Pair 3 1/10 8/100 
Pair 4 10/100 100/1000 
Pair 5 10/100 93/1000 
Pair 6 10/100 87/1000 
Pair 7 1/100 10/1000 
Pair 8 1/100 7/1000 
Pair 9 1/100 5/1000 
Pair 10 1/1000 92/10000 
Pair 11 6/1000 57/10000 
Pair 12 23/1000 211/10000 
Pair 13 33/10000 297/100000 
Pair 14 27/10000 237/100000 
Pair 15 03/74 27/740 
Pair 16 1/56 9/560 
Pair 17 1/257 10/2586 
Pair 18 1/10 91/1000 
Pair 19 1/10 793/10000 
Pair 20 5/100 432/10000 
Pair 21 1/10 11/100 
Pair 22 02/74 24/740 
Pair 23 7/1000 75/10000 
Pair 24 11/100 99/1000 
Pair 25 7/100 61/1000 
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Appendix C – Screenshots of the comparative investment task – Experiment 2 
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Screenshots for the comparative insurance task – Experiment 2 
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Appendix D - Screenshots for the choice task – Between-subject design – Experiment 2 
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Screenshot for the insurance task – Between-subject design – Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 3
4 
Screenshot for the investment task – Between-subject design – Experiment 2 
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